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Which Patent Systems Are Better For Inventors?
by James Bessen (BUSL) and Grid Thoma (Camerino)

Abstract: International comparisons of patent systems are essential to harmonization treaties and to
analyze economic growth. Yet these comparisons often rely on little but conventional wisdom. This
paper develops an empirical method to compare the economic strength and quality of patent systems by
using renewal analysis of matched patents in different countries (same patent family). Comparing
patents on the same inventions filed at the EPO for Germany and in the US, we find that the German
patents generate substantially greater market power than their US equivalents, especially for small
inventors. Also, the average US patent has relatively lower economic value (“quality”).

JEL codes: O34, F42, K19
Keywords: patents, international treaties, technological change

Thanks to Mike Meurer, Bruno van Pottelsberghe, and participants at the BU Workshop on Innovation
and Patent Harmonization, the OECD, and the NBER Tuesday seminar.

Electroniccopy
copy available
available at:
Electronic
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2497495
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2497495

2

Introduction
Which national patent systems provide inventors with the strongest incentives? This question has
been raised in a number of different contexts. In the economic growth literature, researchers have
attempted to assess the importance of patent incentives by using indices of patent “strength” (Ginarte
and Park 1997a, 1997b, Park 2008). The question also arises regarding the many patent treaties that
have been negotiated in recent years. Many treaties propose to harmonize patent law around those
features that maximize inventor incentives. On the one hand, treaties choose to follow the law of those
nations judged to provide stronger incentives. On the other hand, opponents of harmonization often
claim that certain features of national patent law favor critical groups of inventors. For example,
opponents of “first-to-file” in the US claim that this will undermine incentives for the important small
inventors.
However, all of these judgments are apparently based on little other than conventional wisdom
about what makes a patent system “strong.” Yet there are theoretical reasons to question the accuracy of
this wisdom. Does a nation provide inventors with stronger incentives if it allows patents on software
(a component of the Ginarte and Park index)? Perhaps not, if software patents also expose inventors to
costly litigation that they cannot easily avoid (Bessen and Meurer 2008). Do stronger enforcement
mechanisms mean larger incentives? Not if patent rights lack clear and predictable boundaries so that
inventions are subject to overlapping claims (Bessen 2009b). Given the importance of inter-country
comparisons, it might be helpful to have some empirical evidence about incentives.
This paper develops an empirical method to compare inventor incentives across countries. The
notion behind the method is simple: by observing renewal behavior on equivalent patents in different
countries, we infer how patent holders value their patents in these countries. We compare how much
inventors are willing to spend to keep patents in force on the same inventions in different countries,
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relative to the size of each market. If inventors choose to spend more in one country relative to the size
of that market, we infer that those patents confer greater market power and that that country provides
stronger incentives. We estimate the markups realized by equivalent patents in different countries and
these serve as measures of the strength of patent incentives.
Additionally, this approach provides a measure of relative economic quality across patent
systems. Patent systems also differ in the economic value of inventions that they permit to be patented.
Roughly speaking, patent offices that require a greater inventive step should have a population of more
economically valuable patents, all else equal. These patents are more selective or of higher “quality” in
this sense. We can compare the economic value of the average patent granted to our matched sample in
order to compare the selectivity of patent offices in granting patents. By comparing the difference in the
markup between two countries on the average patent to the difference in the markup on the group of
matched equivalent patents, we can measure how much grant selectivity affects average patent markups
as opposed to the economic strength of the patents granted.
The method we use is similar to the patent renewal analysis conducted first by Pakes and
Schankerman (1984).1 Several studies have used this technique to obtain estimates of patent value in
different countries (Pakes 1986, Schankerman and Pakes 1986, Deng 2007). Following Putnam (1996)
other studies have used international patent filings as a way of estimating patent values, including
cross-country estimates.
Our approach differs from this literature in two important ways. First, our focus is on the relative
market power of patents rather than their absolute value. We seek to measure the effective markup
associated with a patent by estimating the patent rents divided by total market size. In theory, rents
derived from a patent of given market power will increase with the size of the market, all else equal.
The previous research assumes, to the contrary, that patent rents do not vary with the size of the market.
1 For overviews of this literature see Lanjouw et al. (1998) and Bessen and Meurer (2008, Chapter 5).
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Our alternative assumption not only affects our model of patent holder behavior within a country, but it
also allows us to compare the economic strength of different countries without having to rely on
exchange rates and different deflators.
Second, we compare patent systems by using patents taken out in different countries on the same
inventions, that is, patents belonging to the same patent family. Previous studies have used such
matched samples of patents to study the effect of the post-grant opposition system in Europe (Graham
and Harhoff 2006), differences in patent search across countries (Lei and Wright 2009), and valuation
of the most valuable inventions (Harhoff et al. 2003), but, to our knowledge, patents matched to the
same families have not been used in renewal analysis. This allows us to decompose patent markups
into two components: an economic strength measure, based on the markups realized on matched
patents in different countries, and an economic quality measure, based on the difference between the
markups earned on the matched patents and the average patent in a country. This is important because
the average patent markup earned in a country depends both on the economic strength of the patent
system as well as on the selectivity of the patent office.
To test this method, we compare patents granted in the US from 1986 through 1996 to patents
applied for at the European Patent Office (EPO) from 1984 through 1994 that were ultimately granted
and designated for protection in Germany. This comparison should let us test views that the US had
significantly “stronger” patent protection then and that the US patent system particularly favored small
inventors. Of course, our measure of patent economic strength captures more than just the strength of
patent enforcement. Patent markups also reflect other aspects of the patent system, such as litigation
risk and patent notice, as well as other differences in industrial structure. For example, if one expects
that the US has more competitive markets, then US patents might have higher market power, all else
equal, because patents would make a bigger incremental difference in rents earned on an innovation. Or
if patents are litigated more often in the US, then this, too, might reduce patent rents: net patent rents
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include the expected cost of litigation necessary to enforce a patent. Also, if litigation arises from
poorly defined patents that generate overlapping claims, this litigation reduces the profits a patent
holder can earn on an innovation.
We further explore the differences in markups between Germany and the US by conducting a
multivariate analysis that identifies those characteristics of patents that contribute to the difference in
markups. We find that small inventors, non-US inventors and patents in medical related technology
have sharply lower markups in the US compared to Germany. Some supplementary analysis suggests
that the divergent litigation environments between the two countries could explain these differences.
A variety of researchers have devised indices for ranking and comparing national patent systems.
As noted, Ginarte and Park (1997) developed an indicator of “patent strength” based on five
dimensions: extent of coverage, membership in international patent agreements, provisions for loss of
protection, enforcement mechanisms, and duration of protection. This index has been widely used in
studies investigating foreign direct investment, inter-firm alliances, patent protection on exporting
activity, economic growth, R&D internationalization and others (for a survey see Papageorgiadis and
Cross 2011). Some researchers have enhanced this index in various ways. Fraser (1999) extended the
coverage in terms of number of countries, whereas Park (2008) provided an important update and
increase the time series after year 2000; Papageorgiadis, and Cross (2011) added components covering
search costs, servicing costs, property rights protection costs and monitoring costs.
De Saint-George and van Pottelsberghe (2011) criticize the Ginarte and Park approach as being a
measure of “applicant friendliness” rather than a true measure of the economic incentives that patents
provide. For example, the Ginarte-Park index reflects the extent that a country’s patents cover different
fields such as software or pharmaceutical compositions. While increased coverage encourages more
patent applications, incentives might actually decrease if greater coverage is accompanied by greater
uncertainty and litigation, reducing the returns that innovators can realize from their patents. Such
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considerations highlight the need to generate empirical estimates of relative incentives.
Undoubtedly, the “strength” of patents might also be related to their “quality,” and a number of
researchers have attempted to develop measures of quality for comparing patent systems by looking at
multiple factors including grant rates (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2000; Palangraya et al., 2011),
speed of grant (Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe, 2000, OECD, 2010), and opposition rates (Graham and
Harhoff, 2006). De Saint-George and van Pottelsberghe (2011) develop a quality index based on legal
and institutional characteristics of the national patent systems. In contrast to these approaches, our
method provides a quality measure based solely on observed behavior.

Model
Market power
Consider the flow of rents that patent i earns in country j at time t, rijt. If the patent holder chooses
to market a product using the patent to provide a degree of exclusivity, then the rents will be equal to
the additional markup of price over cost that the patent conveys times revenues. This markup reflects
the market power conveyed by the patent. If, instead, the patent holder chooses to license the patent,
the rents will equal the royalties received. In this case, the royalty rate on revenues reflects the market
power of the patent. In either case, the rents that patent i earns in country j at year t can be written as
(1)

r ijt =mit M

jt

where m is the markup/royalty associated with patent i and M is industry revenues for the market.
The magnitude of mit depends on both the economic value of invention i and the degree of
exclusivity conveyed by the patent, which reflects the strength of patent enforcement, the clarity of
patent boundaries (the extent of overlapping rights) and the degree of exclusivity provided by other
means. Thus mit reflects both characteristics of the individual patent and the general economic strength

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2497495

7
of patents in a country. Differences in the economic strength of patents across countries should be
captured by differences in the distributions of these values.

Renewal behavior
We can infer differences in patent markups by observing renewal behavior. Patent systems
typically require the payment of periodic fees in order to keep a patent in force. Suppose that country j
requires a payment of cjt in order to keep a patent in force that is t years old (measured from the
application date). Payment of this fee will keep the patent in force an additional T years. The patent
holder will choose to pay the maintenance fee if the present value of the rents earned over the next T
years exceeds the fee.2 This decision rule provides a simple way to infer information about the
distribution of patent markups by looking at when patent holders choose to allow patents to lapse.
In order to do this, however, it is necessary to make some assumptions regarding the way rents
evolve over time. At the very least, rents should depreciate over time with technological obsolescence.
As a starting point, suppose that the market power associated with each patent depreciates at a constant
rate of obsolescence, d. We discuss the appropriateness of this assumption below. Then equation (1) can
be written
(2)

−d t

r ijt =mi0 M jt e

.

Assuming a discount rate of s, the present value of rents earned on patent i from t to t+T is
t T

(3)

w i ≡ ∫ r ijz e
t

−s z−t 

−d t

dz = mi M jt e

− d  s T

1−e
d s

,

where we assume that market size remains constant during the interval and we have dropped the time
subscript on m.3 The decision rule then implies that the patent will not be renewed at t if
2 This assumes that the fee schedule is non-decreasing ( cjt  cjt+1 ), as they are in fact. This condition ensures that it will
not be advantageous to take a loss in the current year in order to make a larger profit later. Because r depreciates, future
profits will be even worse than current year profits if fees meet this condition.
3 This is a slight simplification. In some countries, e.g. the US, patent fees are due some interval (6 months) before the
renewal period begins. We make an adjustment for that in the estimation, but ignore it here to simplify the exposition.
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w i  c jt or ln mi  x jt ≡ ln

(4)

− d  s T
c jt
1 −e
 d t − ln
M jt
d s

The logarithms of the initial patent markups, mi, are distributed within each country according to
some cumulative distribution, ln mi ~ F. This means that if patent holders follow decision rule (4), the
share of patents in country j that have lapsed during or before year t equals F(xjt). Moments of this
distribution for each country provide an index that allows straightforward comparison of patent
markups.

Estimation
In order to estimate moments, we assume a functional form for distribution F. In particular, we
assume that F follows a normal distribution. We find below that a normal distribution fits the data
closely. Specifically, in our basic analysis we assume that
(5)

ln mij =  j   ij

where ε is a stochastic error normally distributed with zero mean and standard deviation of σ.
Following Bessen (2008), we also do a multivariate analysis that takes patent characteristics into
account,
(6)

ln m ij =  j⋅Z ij   ij

where β is a parameter vector to be estimated, Zi is a vector of patent characteristics including a
constant term. Using this more general formulation, the probability that patent i is allowed to lapse in
year l but not before is (temporarily ignoring those patents never renewed or always renewed)
(7)

P [ ln m ij  x jl ∣ ln mij  x jl−1 ] = 



 

x jl − j Z ij
x jl −1− j Z ij
−
j
j



where Φ is the standard cumulative normal distribution function. From this it is straightforward to
define a log likelihood function that can be estimated using standard maximum likelihood techniques,
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(8)

L  j , j =

∑ ln
i

[


 

x jl − j Z ij
x jl−1− j Z ij
−
j
j

]

.

For patents that are never renewed, we treat xjl-1 = - ∞ ; for patents that are always renewed, xjl = +∞.

Comparative measures
Using equation (8), we obtain an estimate of the mean of the distribution, µ. This is the mean of
the distribution of the logarithm of m, which implies that the median of the distribution of m itself is eµ.
Although there are other statistics that can be derived from our estimates, this basic one provides a
simple point of comparison across nations.
Note that by using this test statistic, we avoid one criticism of renewal analysis, namely that
estimates of patent value are based on an extrapolation. Because the most valuable patents are all
renewed to term, renewal analysis does not directly include observations of their values. Some
evidence suggests that extrapolation might not seriously bias the estimates of patent value (Bessen
2009a). Nevertheless, this has been a concern about patent value estimates.
In this paper, however, we primarily use the µ statistic that represents the median patent, which
generally is observed to lapse and so is not based on extrapolation. In other words, we are effectively
comparing nations by measuring the economic strength of their median patents. If one patent system
allows inventors to earn a higher markup on the median patent than they can earn on the same
invention in another nation, then we can infer that, to the first order, the first nation provides inventors
relatively stronger incentives. Of course, it is possible that one nation might somehow provide
comparatively bigger markups on its most valuable patents than it does on its median patent. It is not
clear what conditions would produce such an effect nor do the variances of the distributions appear to
vary much. Moreover, in the analysis below, the differences between the US and Germany are large
enough that only a very dramatic change in markups for the most valuable patents could reverse the
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comparison. Nevertheless, we use this statistic with the caution that while national comparisons based
on these statistics apply for most patents, patent system performance might differ for the very most
valuable patents.
Comparisons between national patent systems can be made along two dimensions. Let µj and µk
designate the estimates for all patents in countries j and k, respectively. Let µje and µke designate the
estimates only for the matched equivalent patents in countries j and k, respectively. Then the relative
economic strength of patent system j compared to patent system k is Pjk and the relative quality of
patent system j compared to k is Qjk:
(9)

P jk ≡  ej −  ek
Q jk ≡  j − 
 k − P jk

That is, Pjk captures the extent to which the patent system j provides higher markups than patent
system k for the patents on the same inventions. Qjk captures the extent to which the average patent
granted in country j has greater economic value than the average patent granted in k because of
differences in the selectivity of the patent grant process in the two countries.
Finally note that nations might differ in the number of patents they use to protect an invention
because of differences in patent scope, different patent office policies regarding multiple patents on the
same invention and different propensities to build patent thickets. When we construct the measures in
equation (9), we use estimates of µ that are adjusted by the number of patents per family for that nation
(adjusted by adding the logarithm of the patents per family to the estimates of log markup).

The depreciation assumptions
The approach we have described so far relies on two assumptions: 1) rents depreciate at a
constant rate, and, 2) this rate is the same across the countries being compared.4 The first assumption—
4 The approach also requires that we choose a particular rate of depreciation, however, it is straightforward to show from
equation (4) that the choice of rate does not affect the ordering of countries according to the index, just the nominal
value of the index. We specify a 15% depreciation rate below; this is a common value in the literature.
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a constant rate—is, in fact, the most common assumption made in the renewal literature. However,
several studies have used specifications that allow varying rates as well as differences between
depreciation and complete obsolescence. Two studies find that depreciation rates vary and can even
increase during the first four or five years after the patent application, but appear to depreciate at a
fixed rate after that (Pakes 1986, Lanjouw 1998). Since almost all of the activity observed in our data
occurs after the fourth year, this suggests that a constant rate of depreciation is not a bad assumption.5
The second assumption—equal rates of depreciation in the two countries being compared—is
consistent with the notion that technological obsolescence causes rents to decline. In a world with
global trade, new technologies should be equally available in both countries, hence they should have
the same effect on rents, all else equal. However, if there are trade barriers or other local market
restrictions, it is possible that economic depreciation might differ between the countries. For example, a
successful innovation might attract imitators in one country while trade barriers might discourage these
imitators from entering the market in the second country. Then the first country might experience faster
depreciation as well as lower markups. Nevertheless, estimates of depreciation rates in the literature on
patent renewals do not vary much, most falling between 10% and 20%.6
By assuming equal and constant rates of depreciation, we simplify the construction of a reliable
index. The renewal data allow us to infer patent rents at a point in time, namely, the time of the decision
to allow the patent to lapse. If depreciation rates varied significantly over time or between countries, we
would need to estimate an average markup over the life of the patent. By assuming constant and equal
5 When we repeat our analysis below but exclude all observations before five years from the application date, the results
do not change significantly.
6 For example, Schankerman and Pakes (1986) find rates of depreciation of 18%, 10% and 25% for UK, Germany and
France, respectively, in their fixed effects regressions. Lanjouw (1998) find rates of depreciation (including
obsolescence, which she measures separately) ranging from 12.1% to 17.7% for different technology groups in
Germany. Schankerman (1998) finds depreciation rates (in fixed effects regressions) ranging from 5.8% to 19.2% for
different technologies in France. Serrano (2005) finds depreciation of 11.6% in the US, while Bessen (2008) find
depreciation of 14.0% in the US. In theory, we could directly estimate depreciation rates in our regressions, however, in
practice the maximum likelihood models do not always converge when we do this. Our regressions are substantially
more complex than those used in most of the renewal literature.
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depreciation rates, we are able to directly convert our estimates of rents at the time a patent lapses to
estimates of patent markups at the patent application date.
While the evidence from the renewal literature suggests that these assumptions are accurate to the
first order in the US and Europe, these indices should be used with care, especially where there is
evidence of trade barriers or other market distortions in the countries being compared. Below, we
conduct a sensitivity analysis to make sure that our comparison is robust to changes in assumptions
about the depreciation rates.

Data and variables
Data sources
Our analysis compares patents granted in the US from 1986 through 1996 to patents granted by
the EPO, with applications filed from 1984 through 1994 and designated for protection in Germany.
Patents granted by the EPO can be designated for coverage in a number of countries, including
Germany, but, once granted, they remain in force only so long as maintenance fees are paid. We study
invention patents in Germany and utility patents, including reissues, in the US. Our datasets include
1,021,300 US patents that are eligible for maintenance fees, 350,619 EPO patents designated for
Germany as well as a supplementary sample of 167,872 patents granted by the German national patent
office. The US patents were identified in the USPTO’s Maintenance Fee Events database, dated
December 27, 2010. The European patents were identified in the EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical
Database (PATSTAT), which is available under license from OECD-EPO Task Force on Patent
Statistics. We used the October 2010 version of PATSTAT.
We chose these ranges of years first because these two samples roughly correspond to patent
applications filed at the same time: the mean lag from application to grant in the US sample is 1.8
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years. The beginning year for the US sample was chosen so that few patents were granted that were
exempt from maintenance fees (because their applications were filed before December 12, 1980 when
the renewal system began coverage). The end year was chosen so that data on payment or non-payment
for the third renewal fee was relatively complete.7
The data on patent renewals and lapses for the US also comes from the USPTO’s Maintenance
Fee Events database. The renewal data for European patents originate from the Patent Registry
Services (PRS) database maintained by the EPO. The maintenance fee schedules change over time. For
the US, these were obtained from the Federal Register and Public Laws. For Germany, we obtained the
fee schedule from the controller office of the German and Trademark Patent Office.
The payment schedules differ substantially. In the US, fees are due at 3.5, 7.5 and 11.5 years after
the date of patent grant and these payments extend coverage from 4 to 8 years, from 8 to 12 years and
from 12 years to the end of the patent term, respectively. In Germany, fees are due annually beginning
two years after the application filing date through the end of the nineteenth year. Each payment extends
coverage for just one year. Both fee schedules are non-decreasing. For example, the US schedule for
2005 goes from $900 at 3.5 years, to $2300 at 7.5 years, to $3800 at 11.5 years. Patent holders
designated as “small entities” in the US pay fees at half this rate. This designation includes independent
inventors, firms with fewer than 500 employees, universities and non-profit organizations. The latest
German schedule goes from 70 Euros at the end of the second year to 1940 Euros at the end of the
nineteenth year. Given the greater frequency of payment, the German maintenance fees are
substantially more expensive and, generally speaking, they will be due earlier in the life of the patent.
Our analysis uses sub-samples of patents where the underlying invention is also patented in the
other country—our “matched” samples. Of course, the differences in law and institutions imply that
inventors will not obtain patent protection in the same way in both countries nor will the patents cover
7 The US Patent Office allows a grace period for re-instating patent coverage where renewal payments have been missed.
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exactly the same things. For example, a patent that makes software claims in the US will be worded
differently at the EPO and may have narrower claims. In many cases, the number of patents filed for an
invention will differ between countries. The picture is further complicated by rules allowing
continuations and divisional patents in the US and rules regarding multiple patents on the same
invention. The patents in the two countries are thus not exactly equivalent, however, they loosely
belong to the same “patent family.” The PATSTAT database helps us identify these patent families. In
the October 2010 version of PATSTAT there are three kinds of patent families (see Martinez, 2010):
1. narrow equivalents, patent documents including exactly the same priorities or
combination of priorities,
2. INPADOC families, patents sharing any direct or indirect priority links across them,
resulting in a consolidated and self-contained group of priority links, and,
3. DOCDB families, patent documents having “similar” sets of priorities, excluding those
patents that do not add new technical knowledge. These families are manually inspected
and defined by the EPO examiners for the purpose of their search work.
We opted to use the INPADOC families, because we think it is more suitable for international
comparisons.8 First, it is broad enough to encompass a more effective and homogeneous unit of
invention across patent offices. Second, at level of the same patent office it is robust to variation
originating from continuations and divisional applications. Third, the INPADOC definition does not
requires a subjective choice by experts, as is the case with DOCDB families.
Using this INPADOC family data, we constructed a sub-sample of 287,634 US patents that
shared a family with at least one patent in the EPO/DE sample and a corresponding sub-sample of
250,382 EPO/DE patents that shared a family with at least one patent in the US sample.
Finally, we obtained data on patent characteristics for US patents from the NBER patent database
8 Graham and Harhoff (2006) also use INPADOC families. Palangkaraya et al. (2011) use strict equivalents for a study of
patent classification at different patent offices.
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(Hall et al. 2001) and we obtained supplementary data on patent litigation from the Derwent Litalert
service.

Market Size
A key variable in our analysis is M, the size of the market. We decompose patent rents into a
markup times the market size for the market corresponding to each patent. This means, in effect, that
we normalize nominal patent fees against nominal market size in equation (4).
We cannot observe the actual market size for each patent in practice. Instead, we assume that the
market size for each patent is proportional to an observable measures of market size and that this
proportion is the same across the countries we study. The constant of proportionality is included in our
estimates of µ and is effectively subtracted out of the calculations of patent strength and quality, P and
Q, in equation (9).
In this paper we use two different observable measures of market size. The first is simply national
GDP. This has the advantage of being readily available for a large number of countries. However, there
are several possible biases that might be introduced by using this measure. First, it does not reflect
differences in the sizes of industrial sectors between nations. For example, if patenting is largely an
activity of manufacturing industries, GDP might overstate the relative size of the market for a nation
with a relatively small manufacturing sector. Second, if one country imports relatively more than the
comparison country, GDP might understate the size of the market. Third, nations might differ in their
degree of vertical integration. GDP is based on total value added, netting out the sale of intermediate
goods used in manufacturing. If one nation sells an intermediate good on the market but the other
nation has vertically integrated producers, the first nation has more opportunities for patents to earn
markups—the so-called “double marginalization” problem. In this case, gross industry output might be
a better measure of market size than value added, hence GDP might understate the size of the market in
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the nation with vertically dis-integrated markets.
To correct for these possible biases, we also use a market size measure based on gross industry
output, we add net imports9, and we apportion patents to 48 different industries. To calculate these
industry measure for each patent, we began with consistent cross-country data on gross output, imports
and exports for a standardized set of 48 industries from the STAN database of the OECD (2005). We
then created a concordance apportioning each patent to one or more industries in STAN.
To create this concordance, we relied on the consolidated patent portfolios of US, EU and
Japanese publicly listed companies. These patent portfolios provide consolidated counts for patent
applications made by these firms at the USPTO, EPO and PCT (Thoma et al. 2010). The idea is to
calculate the share of patents in an IPC class going to firms in a given industry by looking at the share
of patents in each IPC class assigned to publicly listed firms in that industry. In particular, in these three
offices during the period 1978-2007 we could identify 3.4 million patent application filed in 626 IPC 4
digits classes for 10,750 listed companies. Where a patent was listed in more than one IPC class, we
apportioned that patent across those classes, coming up with a fractional patent count.10 Then, we
linked these technology classes to industry SIC codes for those firms using industry data from
Compustat Global Vantage and translating the 4 digit US SIC codes for each firm’s primary line of
business into codes corresponding to the 48 STAN industries.11 Using these data, we calculated the
share of patents in each 4 digit IPC class that went to firms in each of the STAN industries.12 The
9 This assumes, to the first order, that patent rents are earned in the markets where products are sold, ignoring rents that
might be earned on goods produced within a nation but sold abroad.
10 In the overall PATSTAT September 2010 dataset we could identify 635 distinct IPC 4 digits patent classes. We opted not
to take into the account the family links across patent applications because we are interested only on the patent classes in
which these patents are classified. Indeed, it could happen that a patent filling is classified differently in two distinct
patent offices even in the case the patent does not constitute a first filing to the receiving office. For example at the EPO
a PCT filing from an International Search Authority could be republished with a supplementary search report by an EPO
examiner.
11 For more details on how to execute an industry grouping compatible with STAN database starting from the US SIC
codes see Thoma et al. (2010).
12 Dropping out industries that accounted for less than 5% of the total weight for each IPC and pro-rating the remaining
industries.
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market size for each patent in an IPC class is then calculated by multiplying the industry share for that
IPC code times the industry market size (gross output plus net imports) for each year.
Finally, one might wonder whether patent holders sometimes view rents relative to the size of a
regional market rather than the size of a national market. For example, perhaps a German patent is
valuable not only because it brings rents in Germany but also because by protecting Europe’s largest
market, it blocks competitors from entering other European nations. In this case, a German patent
might earn rents outside of Germany and one would expect a Germany to receive a disproportionate
share of European patents. While such considerations might influence some patent holders, it does not
appear to be the dominant behavior, however. In Europe, while over 90% of EPO patents are
designated for Germany, more than 80% are designated for Great Britain and for France. More
generally, each nation’s share of EPO patent designations is roughly proportional to that nation’s GDP
(van Pottelsberghe and van Zeebroeck 2008) with no disproportionate share going to Germany.

Empirical Findings
Data characteristics
Table 1 reports summary statistics on the different samples. Note first that a much higher
percentage of the EPO/DE patents are matched to patents granted in the US.
We use the six NBER technology categories to classify the patents (by the first technology class
listed). We apply the classification for US patents to the matching EPO/DE patents, pro-rating if patent
counts differ between the matched samples (fractional counts). Chemicals, drugs and other medical
patents are more heavily represented in the matched samples.
We also classify the inventor region based on the first inventor listed on the US patent. Not
surprisingly, the matched sample is more likely to include European inventors. Similarly, the matched
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sample is much less likely to include patents owned by small entities. This is not surprising if one
assumes that large multinationals are more likely to enter overseas markets.
The matched patents tend receive more citations and have more claims than unmatched patents in
the US. This corresponds with the notion that patents taken out in two countries are more valuable
patents, all else equal. Also, the matched sample of US patents tends to have slightly more patents per
family than does the matched sample of EPO/DE patents.
Finally, the last two lines show summary statistics that are highly suggestive of the results to
follow. For the matched sample, the last fee that the median patent holder pays in Germany is nearly
twice as large as the last fee paid on the median patent in the US, both calculated in constant dollars.
This is despite the fact that the US GDP is over four times larger than the German GDP. The last line of
the table lists the nominal GDP of the two countries in 1999, near the midpoint of our samples. This
suggests that patent holders are willing to spend substantially more to keep their patents in force in
Germany than in the US, especially relative to the relative sizes of the two markets.
Of course, it is also true that German renewal fees are much higher, as noted above. A skeptic
might wonder whether patent holders naïvely continue paying both fees until they decide it is no longer
worthwhile and then stop paying both of them at the same time. That is, perhaps patent holders have
bounded rationality and do not bother to make the optimal decision indicated by the model above. Then
the higher fees paid in Germany might simply reflect the higher fee schedule there. However, the data
suggest that while some patent holders might behave this way, this is not the dominant behavior. If one
looks at all of the US:EPO pairs in the matched sample where at least one patent in the pair expires (the
median patents fall into this group), the dates on which the last fees were paid fall within a year of each
other only in 11% of the cases. In 17% of the cases, a US fee is paid after the German patent lapses and
in 22% of the cases, a German fee is paid after the US patent lapses (over four years from when the last
US fee was paid). These numbers suggest that patent holders by and large are making different
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decisions in the two countries, however noisy the decisions to renew patents might be. This is
supported by research showing that differences in patent renewal fees across European nations
consistently affect renewal behavior (Danguy and van Pottelsberghe 2011). However, the simple
comparison of the magnitudes of last fees paid does not take into account the timing of when the fees
were paid in each country. For this we need the model.

Scatterplots
By observing the share of patents lapsed at different times over different values of xjt, one can
construct a scatterplot of distribution F for each country. This is shown in Figure 1 for the matched
datasets. Each dataset was broken into a number of cohorts. For the EPO/DE matched sample the
cohorts were by application year; for the US sample the cohorts were by grant year and small entity
status. Each cohort was then broken into sub-groups according to the year in which the patent lapsed.
For each sub-group we calculated xjt and the cumulative share of the total cohort that had lapsed as of
that year.13 These are then plotted in the figure with the horizontal axis representing different values of
xjt and the vertical axis representing the cumulative share of patents that were allowed to lapse at or
before that year. For each dataset, a dashed line shows the best fit for a normal distribution. As can be
seen, the normal distribution fits the data fairly well.
As can be seen, small entities in the US have a distinctly different distribution than large entities.
Furthermore, the distribution for the German EPO patents stochastically dominates the distribution for
large US entities which stochastically dominates the distribution for small US entities in the observed
range of the matched samples. Surprisingly, this figure indicates that the German patent system delivers
substantially higher markups on the same group of inventions.

13 We calculated the values of x assuming a 15% rate of depreciation and applying the mean lag between application date
and patent grant for each cohort of US patents.
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Basic regressions and comparative measures
This notion can be formally tested using the economic strength and quality measures described
above. The top panel of Table 2 shows basic estimates of the logarithm of the patent markup regressed
against a constant for both nation’s datasets, for both the total dataset and the matched sub-samples.
This table reports results normalizing maintenance fees with GDP. Because US renewal fees are
different for small entities and these firms apparently behave differently, we also include a dummy
variable that is 1 for a small entity and zero otherwise in the US regressions.
The bottom panel does the comparison calculations. First, to account for differences arising from
the small entities, the row titled “Mean µ” shows the predicted mean for the sample. These figures are
adjusted for the differences in patents per family between the two samples so that we measure the mean
per invention instead of the mean per patent. Using these means, we can compare the US and EPO/DE
samples. The logarithm of the markup for the US matched sample is lower than the log markup for the
German matched sample by 1.26 and this difference is highly significant. This is an economically large
difference as well, implying that the median invention in the matched sample earns a markup in
Germany that is over three times higher than the markup it earns in the US.
We performed this analysis assuming that the depreciation rate for patents, d, is 15% per annum.
To make sure that our results are robust to variation in the depreciation rate, we repeated the estimates
assuming a rate of 10% and a rate of 20%. The results were broadly similar and the difference in the
mean between the matched samples, P, varied from -1.38 with a 10% depreciation rate to -1.13 with a
20% depreciation rate. Hence our estimate is not particularly sensitive to this choice.
Additionally, we can test how sensitive our estimates are to the assumption of equal depreciation
rates. Suppose that US patents depreciated at 20% per annum while German patents depreciated at only
10% per annum. Then we can calculate the average of the logarithm of the the markup over, say, a
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thirteen year patent life (see Table 1). Comparing these averages, the difference in the log markup
between the countries is now -0.54. This doubling of the relative depreciation rate reduces the index of
relative patent strength, however, even such a large difference does not affect the judgment about which
country has patents with greater market power. Thus our index appears robust to various assumptions
about depreciation rates in this example.
The bottom panel also includes a comparison of the average patent granted in the US to the
average patent granted by the EPO and designated for Germany. The log markup for the US patent is
0.50 less than the log markup for the average EPO/DE patent after taking differences in economic
strength into account as measured in the matched sample. This implies that the US patent office grants
patents that have, on average, 39% less market power than patents granted by the EPO, after
accounting for differences in national patent strength.
However, an inventor seeking to obtain a patent in Germany does not necessarily need to file at
the EPO; an inventor can also file for a German patent at the German national patent office. It is
possible that the average EPO patent is more valuable than the average of all patents filed in Germany
because inventors might find it economical to file their more valuable inventions at the EPO. This
might mean that part of the difference between the USPTO and the EPO in the above comparison might
reflect this special role of the EPO rather than differences in the quality of the grant process. To check
this possibility, we also estimated the markup for patents granted at the German patent office (DEPO).
These are shown in column 5 of Table 2. Clearly, the markups on these patents are not less than those
granted through the EPO, implying that the comparison between the USPTO and the EPO is not biased
by selection issues.
Table 3 repeats these basic regressions normalizing maintenance fees against industry-specific
measures of market size (gross output plus net imports).14 The estimates of the constant term are larger
14 Sample sizes are slightly smaller because not all industries are included in the STAN database for all countries.
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(less negative) than those in Table 2 because the market size measures for individual industries are
substantially smaller than GDP. However, the measures of patent strength and quality are fairly close.
The difference in patent strength, P, is now -1.05 instead of -1.26, and the difference in patent quality,
Q, is now -.53 instead of -.50. Because these differences are not large, it suggests that biases associated
with the distribution across industries in these countries, the relative size of net imports and the degree
of vertical integration are not large.
The finding of higher quality (selectivity) in the European patent system is supported by some
previous research. Graham and Harhoff (2006) find that the post-grant opposition system at the EPO
serves to eliminate some low quality patents that lead to litigation. Lei and Wright (2009) find that the
USPTO fails to find substantial prior art that is found at the EPO. Both of these factors could contribute
to higher economic value of the patents granted at the EPO.
For a comparison with the previous literature, we also obtained estimates of patent value for the
US and German samples using standard renewal analysis.15 For the samples of all patents, the mean
value of US patents was $67,900 while the mean value of the EPO German patents was $175,800, both
in 2005 dollars (medians were $13,400 and $18,200, respectively). For the matched samples, the mean
US value was $92,600 while the mean EPO German value was $190,600 in 2005 dollars (median
values of $33,200 and $19,500, respectively). For small entity patents in the matched sample, the
means were $38,200 and $128,300 for the US and Germany respectively (respective medians of $8,600
and $12,800). Although these estimates are made under slightly different assumptions, they generally
confirm the impression of the greater value of German patents especially relative to the size of the

15 We used a non-linear least squares regression similar to Schankerman (1998) and then used a Monte Carlo analysis as in
Bessen (2008) to compute mean and median values, details available from the authors. We converted these estimates to
2005 dollars as follows. US values are calculated at time of patent grant; EPO/DE values are calculated at the end of the
second year after filing (US patent pendency average 1.8 years in this sample). US values were deflated using the
implicit GDP deflator. The EPO/DE values were deflated using a combined Euro/Deutsche Mark deflator. These values
were converted to current Euros for the second year after application, then converted to US dollars at the current
exchange rate and deflated to 2005 dollars using the GDP deflator.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2497495

23
German economy.

Multivariate analysis
Although the findings about patent office selectivity are consistent with prior research, the large
difference in markups between the US and Germany for the matched sample stands at odds with
conventional wisdom. While a full analysis for the causes of this difference is beyond the scope of this
paper, some clues can be gleaned by looking at which groups of patents display particularly large
differences. Table 4 shows results from multivariate regressions where log m is regressed on a variety
of dummy variables as well as the constant term. The first column shows the results for the US
matched sample, the second column shows the estimates for the EPO/DE matched sample and the third
column shows the US coefficients minus the EPO/DE coefficients, all for estimates where maintenance
fees are normalized by GDP. The three columns in the right-hand panel are for estimates with fees
normalized by industry-specific output.
Three large differences stand out in both groups: small entity patents have much smaller markups
than large entity patents, patents from US inventors have much larger markups than patents from
foreign inventors, and drug and medical patents have smaller markups in the US.16 What do these three
groups of patents have in common? At least the first two are notable for the difficulty of enforcement
and possibly the third group is as well. Small firms have a higher risk of litigation than large firms in
the US (Lanjouw and Schankerman 2004) while this difference is not true in Germany (Cremers 2004).
Also, the relatively high cost of litigation in the US might be especially burdensome for small firms and
individual inventors. Second, patents from foreign inventors are harder to enforce in US courts than are
patents from US inventors because juries tend to be biased against foreigners (Moore 2003). In
contrast, Germany does not have jury trials in patent lawsuits. Finally, the role of the FDA in the US
16 In addition, the industry-specific estimates show lower markups in chemical and computer and communication
technologies.
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might make patents less significant for obtaining rents on patents on drugs and medical devices – if
FDA exclusions provide substantial markups themselves, the markups from patents per se might be
reduced. In addition, non-drug health patents appear to be the most highly litigated technology group in
the US (Lanjouw and Schankerman 2004) and Hatch-Waxman in the US encourages a special category
of litigation over drugs.
To explore this notion of the role of litigation further, we conduct an analysis on litigation
hazards for these same groups in the US matched sample in Table 5. The first column shows a probit
regression of the probability that each patent will be the main patent listed in the Derwent Litalert
database for one or more patent lawsuits. The second column shows a Poisson regression where the
dependent variable is the number of such lawsuits for which the patent is listed. As can be seen, each of
the three groups stands out: small entity patents and medical patents are much more likely to be
litigated multiple times while foreign inventions are much less likely to be litigated relative to US
inventions.
The differences in enforcement for these three groups contribute to the differences in patent
markups on the matched sample. However, they do not fully explain it: the constant terms in Table 4
still differ by roughly the same amount. Nevertheless, these “worst cases” might point to a possible
source of the more general problem. The probability that a patent will be litigated is about four times
higher in the US than in Germany.17 Greater enforcement costs reduce the net rents a patent holder can
expect to receive. Also, if patent rights overlap because of “fuzzy boundaries,” then the risk of
litigation reduces the expected rents on an invention (Bessen and Meurer 2008). Fully exploring this
hypothesis is beyond the scope of this paper, however.

17 Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004, Table 1) report an aggregate litigation hazard of 2.1% over the life of a patent for the
1990s in the US while Cremers (2004, p. 21) reports a litigation hazard of 0.5% for Germany for 1993-5. This difference
might arise from legal, institutional and cultural differences and the larger size of the US market might also contribute to
this difference.
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Conclusion
Using a simple model, this paper develops an empirical method for comparing the patent systems
of two countries along dimensions of patent economic strength and the economic quality of the patent
grant. We apply this method to a comparison between US patents and patents granted by the EPO and
designated for coverage in Germany.
Our findings are at odds with some of the conventional wisdom about these patent systems. For
example, Ginarte and Park (1997a,b, 2008) construct an index of patent “strength” using conventional
considerations of patent enforcement. Their index for 1990 for the US is substantially “stronger” than
their index for Germany (4.52 to 3.71). We find, to the contrary, that patents in Germany earn markups
that are about four times larger than the markups that patents on those same inventions earn in the US.
Also, it is widely argued that the US patent system favors small firms and independent inventors. Our
estimates suggest, to the contrary, that small inventors earn relatively more on their patents in Germany,
than they earn on patents on the same inventions in the US. Although it may well be true that the US
innovation system particularly encourages small inventors, this appears to be despite the US patent
system, not because of it.
Our analysis suggests that these findings might be driven, at least partly, by differences in the
litigation environment between the two countries. If so, this result highlights the bias implicit in
constructing an index of patent “strength” based on enforcement measures that does not also consider
the ways in which patent litigation might reduce the economic incentives for inventors.
Nevertheless, our exercise makes clear that the real economic behavior of national patent systems
differs substantially from the conventional wisdom. An understanding of this behavior based on
empirical evidence seems particularly urgent given the extent to which such conventional wisdom is
used to negotiate patent harmonization as part of trade treaties.
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Table 1. Summary statistics
US
All
1,021,300

Number of patents
Percent matched

Matched
287,692
28%

EPO/DE
All
Matched
350,619
250,382
71%

Technology
Chemical
Computers & Communications
Drugs & Medical
Electrical & Electronic
Mechanical
Others

19%
12%
9%
18%
22%
21%

27%
12%
12%
16%
19%
14%

26%
13%
11%
18%
21%
15%

Inventor region
EPO (original 18)
US
Other

20%
54%
27%

38%
35%
27%

41%
30%
29%

Small entity status
Small entity
Large

27%
73%

12%
88%

12%
89%

1.8
13.8
5.3
12.6

1.8
15.7
6.0
13.3
1.2

4.7
12.9

$ 488

$ 899

Patent characteristics
Mean application to grant lag (years)
Mean life (years from application)
Citations received
Claims
Patents / family
Median last fee paid
(annualized, 2005 $)
Nominal GDP, 1999 (trillion $)

$ 307
9.3

4.8
13.1

1.1
$ 914

2.1

Note: EPO/DE sample are patent applied for at the EPO from 1984 through 1994 and designated for coverage in
Germany when granted. The US sample are patents granted from 1986 through 1996 and subject to renewal fees.
The matched samples are patents that are members of an INPADOC family that also contains at least one patent
in the other country sample. GDP from the World Bank.
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Table 2. Basic estimates, Market size = GDP
US
Parameter
µ
Small entity

Ln L
Percent
small
Observations

EPO/DE

All

Matched

All

(1)

(2)

(3)

-21.09 (0.00)

-20.87 (0.00)

-1.69 (0.00)

-0.97 (0.01)

1.61 (0.00)

1.31 (0.00)

-1312279

-330300

27%

12%

1,021,300

287,634

DEPO
Matched
(4)

(5)

-19.67 (0.00)

-19.59 (0.00)

-19.47 (0.00)

1.86 (0.00)

1.85 (0.00)

1.71 (0.00)

-878973

-630944

-418008

350,619

250,382

167,872

(3)

(4)

Comparison of US to EPO/DE patents
(1)
Mean µ
per family

-21.36 (0.00)

(2)
-20.79 (0.00)

-19.61 (0.00)

Economic strength, P = (2) – (4)

-1.26 (0.01)

Economic quality, Q = (1) – (3) – P

-0.50 (0.01)

-19.53 (0.00)

Note: Maximum likelihood estimation. Asymptotic errors in parentheses. Because small entities are charged
different renewal fees in the US, a dummy variable is estimated for them. The “Mean µ” is then the weighted
mean of the distribution for small and large entities adjusted for the number of patents per family. The economic
strength of the US system is the difference between the mean µ for the US and EPO/DE matched patents. The
quality index is the difference for all patents, less P. This table uses the nation’s GDP to normalize patent fees.
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Table 3. Basic estimates, Market size = industry gross output + net imports
US
Parameter
µ
Small entity

Ln L
Percent
small
Observations

EPO/DE

All

Matched

All

(1)

(2)

(3)

-17.47 (0.00)

-17.18 (0.00)

-1.71 (0.00)

-1.01 (0.01)

1.74 (0.00)

1.50 (0.00)

-1253325

-328277

27%

12%

926,618

264,776

Matched
(4)

-16.22 (0.00)

-16.11 (0.00)

1.95 (0.00)

1.94 (0.00)

-838360

-603092

350,393

250,217

(3)

(4)

Comparison of US to EPO/DE patents
(1)
Mean µ
per family

-17.74 (0.00)

(2)
-17.10 (0.00)

-16.16 (0.00)

Economic strength, P = (2) – (4)

-1.05 (0.01)

Economic quality, Q = (1) – (3) – P

-0.53 (0.01)

-16.05 (0.00)

Note: Maximum likelihood estimation. Asymptotic errors in parentheses. Because small entities are charged
different renewal fees in the US, a dummy variable is estimated for them. The “Mean µ” is then the weighted
mean of the distribution for small and large entities adjusted for the number of patents per family. The economic
strength of the US system is the difference between the mean µ for the US and EPO/DE matched patents. The
quality index is the difference for all patents, less P. This table uses industry gross output plus net imports to
normalize maintenance fees. Each patent is assigned a pro-rated set of industry market sizes using the primary
IPC patent class and a concordance of IPC classes distributed across industry shares.
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Table 4. Multivariate analysis
Normalized to GDP

Constant


US

EPO/DE

(1)

(2)

-20.89 (0.01)

-19.48 (0.01)

1.25 (0.00)

1.83 (0.00)

-0.01 (0.01)

0.03 (0.01)

Computers &
Communications

0.37 (0.01)

Drugs &
Medical

Normalized to industry output
Δ

US

EPO/DE

(1) - (2)

(3)

(4)

-1.41

Δ
(3) - (4)

-17.29 (0.01)

-16.18 (0.01)

-1.11

1.38 (0.00)

1.86 (0.00)

-0.04

-0.01 (0.01)

0.21 (0.01)

-0.21

0.39 (0.01)

-0.02

0.77 (0.01)

1.01 (0.02)

-0.24

0.16 (0.01)

0.44 (0.02)

-0.27

0.48 (0.01)

1.05 (0.02)

-0.57

Electrical &
Electronic

0.17 (0.01)

0.11 (0.01)

0.06

0.35 (0.01)

0.41 (0.01)

-0.07

Mechanical

0.01 (0.01)

0.04 (0.01)

-0.03

0.00 (0.01)

0.01 (0.01)

-0.01

-0.52 (0.01)

-0.40 (0.01)

-0.12

-0.63 (0.01)

-0.53 (0.01)

-0.10

0.33 (0.01)

-0.15 (0.01)

0.47

0.32 (0.01)

-0.19 (0.01)

0.52

-0.89 (0.01)

-0.32 (0.01)

-0.57

-0.88 (0.01)

-0.35 (0.01)

-0.53

Technology
Chemical

Inventor region
EPO (original
18)
US
Small entity
N
ln L

287,689

250,378

264,774

250,213

-319681.8

-628323.2

-314908.5

-595351.5

Note: Maximum likelihood regressions, asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. The excluded categories are
Other technologies, Other inventor regions, and large entities. We use the technology classification of Hall et al.
(2001). The left panel is for estimates with maintenance fees normalized by national GDP. In the right panel,
maintenance fees are normalized by gross industry output plus net imports.
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Table 5. Litigation hazards for US matched sample
Estimation procedure

Probit

Dependent variable

Poisson

Patent is main patent
in one or more suits
(yes=1, no=0)

Number of lawsuits
in which patent is
main patent

Technology
Chemical
Computers & Communications
Drugs & Medical
Electrical & Electronic
Mechanical

-0.33 (0.03)
-0.06 (0.03)
0.08 (0.03)
-0.19 (0.03)
-0.17 (0.03)

-1.06 (0.06)
0.13 (0.06)
0.39 (0.05)
-0.44 (0.06)
-0.35 (0.06)

Inventor region
EPO (original 18)
US

-0.03 (0.03)
0.55 (0.02)

-0.01 (0.06)
1.60 (0.05)

Small entity
Constant

0.27 (0.02)
-2.63 (0.03)

0.51 (0.04)
-5.03 (0.06)

N
Pseudo Rsq

287,689

287,689

0.071

0.078

Note: Regressions for the US matched sample on the probability that a patent is the main patent (as listed by
Derwent) in litigation through 2009. Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 1. Cumulative distribution of patent markups
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